Simmons (1993) presents a significant challenge in this regard. Simmons points out that the above statement is formulated as a sufficient condition rather than a necessary one. Two persons, in the state of nature, might be able to authorize a third party to settle disputes between them without leaving the state of nature, since, for example, the third party would not have the power to legislate for the common good. Simmons also argues that other interpretations often ignore the fact that there are people who live in states with legitimate governments that are nevertheless in the state of nature: visiting aliens (Two Treaties 2:9), minor children (2:15, 118), and those who have a “defect” of reason (2:60). He argues that the state of nature is a relational concept that describes a particular set of moral relations that exist between certain people, rather than a description of a particular geographical territory where there is no government with effective control. The state of nature is only the way of describing the moral rights and duties that exist between persons who have not consented to the determination of their disputes by the same legitimate government. The aforementioned groups may or may not give consent, so they remain in their natural state. Thus, A may be naturally relative to B, but not relative to C. The most direct reading of Locke`s political philosophy shows that the concept of consent plays a central role. His analysis begins with individuals in a state of nature in which they are not subject to a common legitimate authority with the power to make laws or settle disputes. From this natural state of freedom and independence, Locke emphasizes individual consent as the mechanism by which political societies are created and individuals join these societies.
Although there are, of course, certain general duties and rights that all human beings have under natural law, special obligations arise only when we assume them voluntarily. Locke clearly states that it is only through an act of explicit consent that one can become a full member of society (Two Treatises 2.122). The literature on Locke`s consent theory tends to focus on how Locke successfully or unsuccessfully responds to the following objection: Few people have actually accepted their governments, so no or almost no government is really legitimate. This conclusion is problematic because it clearly contradicts Locke`s intention. Still other commentators focus on the third argument, namely that the magistrate may be wrong. Here is the question of whether Locke`s argument is questionable or not. The two most promising arguments are as follows. Wootton (1993) argues that, from the perspective of a particular individual, there is very good reason to think that governments will be wrong about which religion is true. Governments are motivated by the pursuit of power, not truth, and are unlikely to be good leaders in religious matters.
Since there are so many different religions held by the rulers, if only one is true, then my own leader`s views are probably not true. Wootton therefore accepts Locke as proof that, from the point of view of the individual, it is irrational to accept state support for religion. Another interpretation of the third argument is presented by Tuckness. He argues that the likelihood of a judge being wrong creates a principle of tolerance based on what is rational from the point of view of a legislator, not from the point of view of a citizen or leader. Drawing on Locke`s later writings on tolerance, he argues that Locke`s theory of natural law assumes that God, as the author of natural law, takes into account the fallibility of judges who will execute the commandments of natural law. If “using force to promote true religion” were a commandment of natural law addressed to all judges, it would not favor true religion in practice because so many judges mistakenly believe that their religion is the true one. Tuckness argues that in Locke`s later writings on tolerance, he moved away from accepting arguments based on what is instrumentally rational for an individual. Instead, he emphasized human fallibility and the need for universal principles.
For Locke, on the other hand, the state of nature is characterized by the absence of government, but not by the absence of mutual obligations. Beyond self-preservation, natural law or reason also teaches “that all humanity, which only wants to consult it, must not harm others in their life, freedom or property, since they are all equal and independent.” Unlike Hobbes, Locke believed that individuals are inherently endowed with these rights (to life, liberty, and property) and that the state of nature could be relatively peaceful.